Afghanistan war: the violence never stopped despite the US-led coalition's best efforts

MY ONLINE PIECE ON AFGHANISTAN WAR IN THE TIMES TODAY: From the very beginning of what would become America’s longest war, there were fundamental errors in strategy, tactics, equipment and objectives. In some senses, Afghanistan has been transformed by the mere presence of US-led forces: more schools; a dramatic expansion in medical centres; new roads; a better life for women and education for girls; a multi-billion dollar programme to build Afghan defence forces; and shaky but constant protection of the nation’s vulnerable democratic government. However, the violence never stopped — the killing was relentless. The Taliban insurgents were successfully driven from key areas but soon made their way back. There were no safe areas, not the capital Kabul, not Helmand and Kandahar provinces in the south, not Herat in the west, not Kunduz in the north, nor Jalalabad in the east. The Washington Post reported recently that the US government and the Pentagon had persistently lied about the appalling status of the military campaign in Afghanistan. But in fact the US and western coalition commanders overseeing the war were often brutally honest about the challenges they faced throughout the 18 year conflict. Whether it was right or wrong to send a huge interventionist army into Afghanistan, rather than keeping a small elite force of special operations troops as recommended by Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary from 2001 to 2006, it is too late to make an accurate judgment. The US and its partners did decide to go big, eventually. By May 2009, the US had 50,000 troops in Afghanistan but there were mixed views about the objectives of their mission. In 2006, Britain sent the 3,300-strong 16 Air Assault Brigade into Helmand to protect projects designed to help rebuild the war-ravaged country. But, contrary to intelligence assessments, Helmand turned out to be the most dangerous province in the whole of Afghanistan. The soldiers were well-armed but totally unprepared for such an onslaught. Troop numbers proved fatally insufficient. Platoon “houses” of around 30 British paratroopers were scattered around the various district centres in Helmand to fend off the Taliban. However, they found themselves immersed in colonial-style Rorke’s Drift scenarios, except that instead of a final glorious victory, they were slaughtered fighting day and night against hordes of insurgents. The word “reconstruction” was rapidly dropped. Lord Richards of Herstmonceux, former UK chief of defence staff and commander of the international force in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2007, said: “Don’t go to war unless your vital national interests are at stake and if you decide to, do it full-bloodedly and with total commitment, and there must be a political outcome integrated into one’s war plan from the outset or failure is guaranteed.” The US, British and partner nations were forced to adapt as the Taliban grew in strength. The British army’s Viking armoured vehicles proved incapable of protecting troops from the blast of improvised explosive devices. The US had to rush to build mine-resistant MRAP vehicles, and troop numbers continued to rise. By the height of the war in 2010, the US had 100,000 troops in Afghanistan. The British made fatal errors with military equipment too. The worst was the deployment of “snatch” armoured Land Rovers to Afghanistan. Their use in the Northern Ireland troubles had been effective but in Afghanistan they became mobile coffins. Dozens of soldiers were killed by roadside bombs. When British troop numbers rose to 9,000 by 2009, there were fewer than a dozen heavy-lift helicopters to transport them around Helmand. That forced commanders to use road vehicles, leading to heavy casualties. The return of dead soldiers and marines in body bags to RAF Lyneham, Wiltshire, became a national tragedy, with funeral corteges driving through the main street of nearby Wootton Bassett lined with thousands of mourners. All the while, as Western troops were failed by either too little equipment or the wrong hardware, the objectives of the war were multiplying: defeating the Taliban; nation-building; and bringing an end to opium production. Andrew Krepinevich, a former US army officer who also served on the personal staff of three defence secretaries, said: “The main lesson to be learned is that we Americans and our allies cannot win these kinds of wars by winning the local population’s hearts and minds. Only the Afghan government can accomplish this. “This is because eventually we were bound to depart and the [Afghan] government would be left with the challenge of convincing its people that they could provide them with a better life and protect them from insurgents.”