Putin and Xi Zinping love-in

If ever there was strategic military cooperation between China and Russia in the war in Ukraine it would add a new dangerous ingredient to a conflict which already has the potential for developing into a wider security crisis. The US has repeatedly warned Beijing against providing weapons to help the Russian invasion force in Ukraine, hinting at the dire consequences for China if President Xi Zinping were to take this path. Until now the Chinese leader has adopted a dual strategy: siding with President Putin in a regional partnership against the United States and Nato’s open-door expansionist policy, yet without backing Russia’s war, either with weapons or with words. Xi is ever the pragmatist. His priority is always: what will benefit China and how would support for Putin’s war negatively impact Chinese relations with Washington and, more importantly, his stated vision of converting his nation into an economic and military superpower to rival and then overtake the US. The latest phone call between the two leaders is part of this pragmatic approach. While Putin may be desperate to have Beijing more openly supportive of his military aggression, even to the point of China providing drones to restock Moscow’s dwindling supplies, Xi will have calculated that supplying weapons to Russia would for ever alter the delicate geopolitical balance with Washington. There is already a long history of military cooperation between China and Russia, dating back to the 1990s, initially linked to border confidence-building measures but later moving into technological transfers for aerospace engine development and regular joint armed forces exercises. Since 2007, more than 70 per cent of Chinese arms imports have been from Russia, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still relies on Russian-made engines for many of its aircraft. However, overt arming of Russia for its war in Ukraine would put the cooperative ties between Beijing and Moscow on a different plateau. That would benefit Putin more than it would Xi who is struggling to cope with an indifferent economy affected by the Covid pandemic and the new surge in infections across the country. The last thing Xi wants is a further tightening of sanctions imposed by Washington. Selling Chinese armed drones for use in Ukraine would instantly lead to a new round of punishing economic penalties. It would also undercut Beijing’s stance of remaining neutral over the war in Ukraine while urging a peaceful regional solution. Xi is a far more meticulous and canny strategist than Putin. The Russian leader has a bull-in-the-china-shop approach, taking action based on his conviction that might will win. The invasion of Ukraine proved that strategy to be hopelessly over-optimistic. Xi on the other hand, with Taiwan in mind, has learned from Putin’s failing venture in Ukraine that military superiority, at least in terms of manpower and warship/tank/ballistic missile/fighter aircraft assets, does not necessarily win wars. The US learned that lesson in Vietnam. So, pledging to join Putin in trying to conquer Ukraine would be an alliance too far for the Chinese leader and would probably prove as disastrous for Beijing as it is for Moscow. Yet at the same time, if or when he does launch military action against Taiwan, Xi will want Putin on side. This is why he is happy to be seen underlining the close friendship with Moscow but without doing anything to anger Washington. ‘