What does the US want out of a deal with the Taliban?

A 67-year-old veteran US diplomat fluent in Pashto and Dari is heading one of the most challenging foreign policy missions of President Trump’s administration – attempting to bring to an end the 17-year war with the Taliban and constructing a lasting peace settlement in Afghanistan. Zalmay Khalilzad, Afghan-born and former ambassador in Kabul, Baghdad and the United Nations, is perhaps uniquely placed to achieve what no other envoy, foreign occupying army or international peacekeeping force have ever achieved. However, as Ambassador Khalilzad prepares for his next visit to Doha, capital of Qatar, to meet with Taliban delegates – now boosted by the presence of five former Guantanamo detainees – how confident can the US be that it will get what it wants out of a peace deal when the insurgents are still controlling many key areas and killing Afghan troops at a record level? They hold potentially trump cards. Mr Khalilzad, appointed special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation in September, has already met with the Taliban at their political office in Qatar as well as leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan, urging them to form “inclusive and authoritative” negotiating teams. However, he has a mandate which includes language that the Taliban has scoffed at for nearly two decades which is why Mr Trump’s special envoy has a seemingly impossible task ahead of him, were it not for the fact that the insurgent leaders themselves have given an indication that they are now in the mood for talking about a political settlement. There appears to be little on offer from Washington. US administration objectives have remained almost unchanged since reconciliation was first raised as a way forward for Afghanistan many years ago. “The Taliban must realise there is not a military solution to the conflict and that they cannot gain legitimacy through violence,” a US state department spokesman said. “They have to recognise the need to make the decisions that get them closer to a negotiated settlement which means they will have to sit with the Afghan government and other interested Afghans to develop a political roadmap for the future of their country,” the official said. “It also means they have to deal with the legitimate US and international concerns that Afghanistan does not become a base for terrorists again that would threaten the United States. This remains our primary condition,” the official said. Without a pledge that the Taliban will never again give sanctuary to al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations, the US administration would for ever face the anguish and anger of the thousands of families who lost loved ones fighting in the 17-year war and the tens of thousands of combat veterans who returned home with life-changing injuries or turned to suicide to end their mental suffering. Lieutenant-General David Barno, US commander of American and coalition forces in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005 who was in charge of the military when Mr Khalilzad was ambassador in Kabul, said his greatest fear, shared he believed by those who had served in Afghanistan, was that the bar for a deal with the Taliban might be lowered too far under the current administration. “Veterans would support the Taliban playing a role in government but what they could never support is a situation in which the Taliban is allowed eventually to take over the government and take control of the country once again,” he said. Underlining the obstacles to peace, a former senior US diplomat said: “The US needs the Taliban to recognise the government in Kabul as legitimate and agree to pursue its interest in political power through the electoral process while agreeing some kind of disarmament, demobilisation and reconciliation process to integrate Taliban fighters into Afghan society.” The Taliban price for cooperation will be high. With their gains on the battlefield, they would be in a position to demand senior posts in the Kabul government, perhaps defence, interior, justice and other ministries. “The trick I suppose is what kind of power-sharing arrangements get negotiated in the interim. It is a pretty tall order and I have my doubts as to whether a negotiated outcome is possible,” the former diplomat said. “However, I do agree that Zal Khalilzad is as good a person to negotiate on this as anyone.” There are currently around 15,000 US troops in Afghanistan, down from the peak of 100,000 in 2010 and 2011. Will the US insist on having a permanent military force in Afghanistan, even after a negotiated peace settlement? The Taliban has always stated its priority aim is to rid Afghanistan of all foreign troops and will not negotiate while a US force remains. A former senior Pentagon official said “a small residual US presence” would be necessary for three reasons. “First, to ensure there is no return to the situation as it existed on 9/11, second, to enhance prospects for closer cooperation with India which is emerging as a major player in the competition for security in the Indo-Pacific, and, third, to maintain positional advantage relative to China and Russia,” he said. The US state department spokesman was less proscriptive. “The US military presence in Afghanistan remains entirely conditions-based which is the cornerstone of the administration’s strategy,” he said. “Our military presence is not an end in itself. It is the responsibility of the Taliban and other Afghans to bring about conditions that would make the level of US military presence negotiable,” he said.