Why China should think twice about invading Taiwan

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would present Beijing with a multitude of challenges despite the awesome superiority in ground, air, naval and missile forces enjoyed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Taiwan’s topography is the greatest challenge for an invading amphibious force, with sheer mountains rising from the beaches and a series of heavily fortified mini-island outposts that would pose a serious threat to PLA warships. The Taiwan Strait close to the island is also mined. In terms of firepower and combat capability, the PLA has everything at its disposal to overwhelm the Taiwanese forces, including thousands of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles and a massed array of fighter aircraft and bombers. China’s fifth-generation Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter, also known as the Mighty Dragon, is an aircraft with capabilities that cannot be matched by Taiwan’s advanced F-16V Viper supplied by the US. Crucially, for Taiwan’s ability to survive a first onslaught of Chinese mainland forces, the PLA’s military doctrine calls for an initial overpowering cyber attack to decapitate Taiwan’s command and control systems and critical national security infrastructure. Such an attack could potentially wipe out communications between the Taiwanese military and the country’s political leadership. However, Taiwan has been planning for an invasion ever since it was clear that Beijing intended to reunify the breakaway island to China’s mainland governance whether by diplomacy or by military force. As a result, huge bunkered alternative government and military facilities have been constructed in the island’s granite mountains to safeguard communications from a PLA electromagnetic strike. The PLA would be expected to follow up a cyber attack with a combination of ballistic missile strikes, parachute drops of airborne and special forces and an amphibious landing. But an American analyst specialising in Taiwan told The Times in an interview last year: “Taiwan is God’s gift when it comes to defending. There are 14 beaches, all bordered by bluffs, most between 1,000ft and 2,000ft and some much higher, “ said Ian Easton, senior director at the Project 2049 institute in Arlington, Virginia and former China expert at a Pentagon-funded centre for naval analysis. “These topographical features favour the defenders and there are tunnels dug everywhere to provide cover for attacks on invading forces,” he said. However, even if Taiwan managed to survive the first and maybe even the second wave of air and ground force attacks by the PLA, it’s unlikely the Taiwanese armed forces could continue to defend the island without outside help. In effect, without American naval and air support. China has weapons and manpower superiority, not just overall in the military balance between Beijing and Taipei but also in the eastern and southern regions which the Pentagon refers to as the Taiwan Strait forces. For example, the PLA has six amphibious brigades, five Marine brigades, seven airborne brigades and and five artillery brigades based in the Taiwan Strait area. The amphibious brigade has 49 tank-landing and assault ships; and the PLA has a total of 35 diesel and nuclear attacksubmarines in the region, compared with Taiwan’s two diesel attack boats. China also has four strategic ballistic-missile submarines in the area. In the event of a war with Taiwan, the PLA’s eastern and southern theatre navies would be involved in direct action against the Taiwan navy. PLA air force support would be supplemented by civilian aircraft sequestered for troop-carrying, according to an analysis by the Pentagon. Key to any future conflict would be Taiwan’s ability to defend against ballistic-missile attack. Taiwan has the Patriot anti-missile weapon provided by the US and an arsenal of thousands of its own short-range and medium-range missiles coming from a domestic production line that has accelerated to 500 a year. However, Taiwan would face a potential barrage of China’s most deadly Dongfeng ballistic missiles with ranges far exceeding the Taiwanese own arsenal of missiles. They include the 240-kilometre range Wan Chien, the 150-kilometre Hsiung Feng III and the 120-kilometre Tien Chi. A 2,000-kilometre range Yun Feng missile is under development. To underline Taiwan’s determination to withstand a PLA invasion, the defence ministry in Taipei presented a budget of $17 billion for 2022 to purchase advanced air-defence systems for the navy’s frigates, more armed drones and multiple missiles for the F-16V fighter aircraft. The F-16V Vipers are kept safe from Chinese attack by being housed in the same granite-mountain bunkers where the Taipei government will relocate in time of conflict.