Could the US have overthrown Bashar al-Assad in 2013?

In hindsight, did the US, UK and France fail to seize the chance to topple President Bashar al-Assad in 2013? This is the question that convinced Wes Streeting, health secretary, to attack his colleague, Ed Miliband, energy secretary and former Labour leader, for orchestrating the vote that threw out the proposal by the then government of David Cameron to join the US and France in airstrikes against Damascus in retaliation for chemical atrocities on the Syrian people. Streeting concluded that if Labour in opposition had supported the vote for airstrikes, Assad’s regime would have fallen, thus bringing relief and liberation for the Syrian population. Speaking on BBC’s Question Time on Thursday, Streeting said:”With insight, I think we can say, looking back on the events of 2013, that the hesitation of this country and the United States created a vacuum that Russia moved into and kept Assad in power for much longer.” The conclusion might have some merit were it not for the fact that Russia, with military and political muscle, had created such a long-lasting footprint in Damascus that even a series of US-led airstrikes to destroy the regime’s chemical weapons sites would not have persuaded, let alone forced, Assad to seek refuge in Moscow, as he has now done 11 years later. Moreover, when President Obama drew up his “red line”, declaring that proof of chemical attacks by Assad would lead to comprehensive airstrikes on Syrian weapons facilities, he did not have regime--change in mind. Airstrikes have played a crucial role in many wars in the last two decades. But no one, apart from a few dreaming air chiefs, believe that dictators can be toppled by bombing raids, without troops on the ground to follow through. Miliband, conscious of these arguments at the time, has rejected his cabinet colleague’s suggestion that a golden opportunity was lost to get rid of Assad. Sadly, Miliband is right. It’s too simplistic to believe that Assad would have run at the first fall of bombs. Nevertheless, history shows that it was Russia, not the United States, which seized the golden opportunity in 2013. Sergey Lavrov, the wiliest of Russian foreign ministers, stepped in and declared in an almost off-the-cuff manner, that Moscow would ensure that Syria gave up all of its chemical weapons. So, no need for bombing. It was a masterly stroke. Obama had made a firm commitment to launch airstrikes after clear evidence of Syrian regime sarin nerve agent strikes on rebels and civilians in Ghouta, a suburb to the east of Damascus in August, 2013, killing 1,400 people. The US military objective was not to strike at the regime as such but to destroy as much of the chemical stocks as possible and to deter Damascus from turning to these weapons in the future. The failure of the Cameron government to persuade the Miliband-led Opposition and 30 Tory MPs to back Britain’s involvement in the planned air raids was a big setback for Obama. But it wasn’t terminal. His red line still stood and the US could have gone ahead with France. However, the Lavrov intervention which took place while he was standing next to John Kerry, US secretary of state, at a press conference in London, miraculously removed the Obama red line at a stroke. Kerry grabbed the Russian offer and within a remarkably short time (less than 12 months), 97 per cent of Assad’s 1,300 tonnes of chemicals and poisons had been destroyed. Assad survived and Moscow congratulated itself on a diplomatic coup. The US played a vital role in the destruction programme, but Obama had blinked and looked weak. The outcome was, on the surface, a triumph. But it wasn’t to last long. Assad had kept back enough hidden chemical stocks and started using feared helicopter-launched barrel bombs filled with chemicals as the civil war spread. In April, 2018, with Donald Trump in the White House, the US, UK and France carried out airstrikes on suspected Syrian chemical facilities. Again, Assad survived. The lesson learned is not, as Streeting is suggesting, that an opportunity was missed to overthrow Assad in 2013, but that any sign of weakness when dealing with regimes such as Assad’s will be ruthlessly exploited. Moscow seized its chance when it detected a wavering Obama and as a result outplayed Washington. Moscow was helped by the decision of the UK parliament to opt out of joining the US in airstrikes. For that decision, Miliband has to accept some responsibility.