How good or bad is Biden's Middle East foreign policy legacy?

No one can accuse President Joe Biden of failing to do his utmost to prevent a full-scale war from breaking out in the Middle East. He and his indefatigable envoys have this year spent more hours of the day on the Middle East than any other issue. The intensive diplomatic efforts by Antony Blinken, secretary of state, Jake Sullivan, national security adviser, Bill Burns, CIA director, and Amos Hochstein, Biden’s man for Lebanon, among others, were supposed not only to find a workable solution to the myriad of crises but also enhance the president’s foreign policy legacy after what has turned out to be only one term in office. The Middle East has been a political and diplomatic graveyard for successive American presidents. But Biden’s hopes of forging an historic alliance between Israel and Saudi Arabia as part of a grand vision of fending off Iran, Israel’s Enemy Number One and the arch manipulator behind every theatre of conflict in the region, fell brutally by the wayside when hundreds of Tehran-trained Hamas fighters crossed the border from Gaza on October 7and committed the worst atrocity on the Jewish people since the Holocaust. The slaughter of at least 1,200 people and the kidnapping of around 250 threw all of Biden’s grand-design diplomacy into an abyss from which it has failed to reemerge in the intervening eleven and a half months. Biden now has about 16 weeks left of his presidency to broker some form of settlement, or a stepping back from a regional war at the very least, if he hopes to depart from the Oval Office in January with a Middle East legacy of which he can be proud. The omens are not good. Ever since October 7, Biden and his team have faced intransigent and obstructive players, seemingly determined to undermine or ignore his administration’s endeavours to bring a lasting ceasefire to the war in Gaza, a return of all the hostages, alive and dead, and to stop a disastrous repeat of the war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, has agreed to many of Biden’s plans and proposals but in the end he has always gone his own way. By all accounts, Biden and Netanyahu have had frequent angry conversations over the phone, highlighting the frustration on both sides. In the midst of continuing ceasefire efforts by Washington with Egypt, Qatar and others, Netanyahu authorised the assassination of Ismael Haniyeh, political leader of Hamas (and principal ceasefire negotiator in Qatar) while attending the inauguration of the new Iranian president in Tehran, gave the go ahead for detonating thousands of Hezbollah pagers and walkie-talkies with Mossad-supplied explosives, and lined up two reserve infantry brigades to launch an incursion into southern Lebanon. Now, Netanyahu has rejected the 21-day ceasefire proposal by the US, UK and other countries to suspend the firefighting between Israel and Hezbollah. Dealing with Israel, a longstanding friend, partner and ally to the United States, should have been the easy part for Biden’s diplomacy and foreign policy strategy . But Netanyahu, reliant as he is for his political survival on an extreme right-wing coalition which demands no concessions of any kind, has been unable or unwilling to contemplate anything other than the annihilation of Hamas, after October 7, and retribution against Hezbollah for supporting Hamas with constant rocket firings over the border into Israel. The succession to the political leadership role of Hamas by Yahya Sinwar, architect of the October 7 massacre who has refused to consider further ceasefire and hostage releases while Israeli troops remain in Gaza, has added to the Biden administration’s growing realisation that all the efforts made to bring this nightmare to a close are going to end in failure. They won’t give up but time is running out. Could Biden have done more? Could he have saved his legacy in the Middle East by adopting a much tougher stance with Netanyahu, notably by rigorously opposing the expansion of Jewish settlements on the West Bank which has led to violent clashes with Palestinians, and perhaps by demanding a quid pro quo: more arms for Israel in return for an agreed timetable to lay down the foundations for creating a new and improved Palestinian Authority to run Gaza as well as the West Bank once the war is over. The reality is that after October 7, there was never going to be a moment when Netanyahu would be ready, let alone, happy, to discuss Gaza being placed in the hands of the much-maligned Palestinian Authority. As for the two-state solution, Israel and a sovereign Palestine living amicably alongside each other, that scenario is further away than ever and there is nothing Biden can do about it before he hands over to a new president on January 20. President Jimmy Carter signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, a peace treaty forged after 14 months of diplomacy which ended hostile relations between Israel and Egypt. Under President Bill Clinton, the Oslo Accords were signed by Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1993 after months of secret negotiations. Biden began his administration with high hopes of a new broad Arab-Israeli alliance which could have brought greater stability to the whole region. His legacy would have been assured. Instead, the war in Gaza continues relentlessly and without any sign of stopping in the near future, and a new war between Israel and Hezbollah appears unavoidable.