Should tunnel warfare in Gaza be avoided?

Operation Swords of Iron, Israel’s codename for the retaliatory military strikes against Hamas in Gaza, underscores the tactics used so far to meet the stated objective which is the total elimination of the terrorist-designated organisation. This is not a shock-and-awe, full-scale invasion ending in regime-change, like the US-led coalition high-intensity offensive against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003. It’s a phased, focused, tactical battle to remove an enemy skilled, experienced and armed for urban warfare. The current night raids by infantry and special forces units, backed by land, sea and air bombardment, described as the second phase of the operation, is likely to be followed by the deployment of a significantly larger number of troops and tanks to try and seal off northern Gaza. The element of surprise, normally crucial for successful warfare, was not available for the Israeli defence forces at the start of the operation, because Hamas expected and had planned for retaliation. So, the key to success for Israel’s military commanders will be to adopt tactics which Hamas is not anticipating. This might rule out sending thousands of Israeli soldiers down the 300-mile stretch of layered tunnels to seek and destroy the Hamas strongholds which are buried up to 80 metres deep beneath the concrete foundations of many of Gaza’s largest buildings, including hospitals, schools and mosques. Hamas will have planned for tunnel warfare and will have built up the capabilities to counter an infusion of Israeli troops armed with all the latest weaponry and special forces combat skills. Israel in recent days has received advice from some of the most experienced urban warfare specialists in the world, one of whom, Lieutenant-General James “Jim” Glynn of the US Marine Corps, spent four days providing unique insights into the challenges of finding and killing the enemy in a packed urban environment, below and above ground. Before the Israeli action began, there were 9,000 Palestinian residents n Gaza City for every square kilometre, similar in density to places such as Fallujah in Iraq where Glynn fought as a combat commander in 2004. Glynn has now returned to the US, but the lessons he learned in Fallujah will have been invaluable to the Israelis. This is not a war where bunker-busting bombs dropped by Israeli aircraft will clear Gaza of its tunnel complex. Israel claims to have destroyed 150 tunnels with such bombs but most of the underground “Gaza Metro” is not reachable or targetable from the air because of where they are concealed. The Hamas tunnels also house the 200 or so hostages, so Israeli special forces will be inhibited from using explosive devices to clear tunnels unless they have specific intelligence of the location of the kidnapped civilians. “Hamas is counting on us entering every bunker and every tunnel with tweezers in order to exact a heavy bloody price from us,” Naphtali Bennett, former Israeli prime minister, has said. He has proposed imposing a siege on northern Gaza, “to dry up and suffocate the Hamas terrorists in the tunnels until they are forced out”. While this might make practical, casualty-avoiding sense, it’s likely that Hamas will have taken this possibility into account and may have moved some of their leadership and weaponry to southern Gaza, to hide beneath the more than one million Palestinians urged by Israel to evacuate from the north.