Is there any real hope of a nuclear arms deal between the US and China?

The agreement between President Biden and President Xi to discuss nuclear arms control has been hailed as a breakthrough but realistically the chances of a meaningful deal are low. Under Xi, China is progressing rapidly towards its aim of being a military superpower on a par with the United States by 2049. All elements of Beijing’s military modernisation programme, including the build-up of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, have that objective in mind. Looking at arms control through Beijing’s eyes, the only reason why Xi would be interested in US/China talks would be to persuade Washington to make substantial cuts in its nuclear stockpile. There is no obvious quid pro quo that Beijing would wish to offer because even if China were to reach 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, as predicted by the Pentagon, the US would still have a more than 3-1 numerical advantage. The current US arsenal stands at 3,750 warheads. Moreover, any talk of warhead reductions by the US could not take place without the involvement of Russia. It remains to be seen whether China would contemplate a trilateral arms control discussion which the US has been pushing for unsuccessfully for many years. However, there are areas where bilateral negotiations might have a positive influence on relations between the US and China, if only to introduce an element of transparency on the key question: at what point would either side be prepared to resort to using nuclear weapons? This has become an important issue because of the move towards deploying ballistic missiles with low-yield nuclear warheads. The US already has low-yield warheads (8-10 kilotons) fitted to some of the Trident II missiles on board Ohio class strategic submarines, and Chinese strategists have written about the need for lower-yield nuclear weapons to increase deterrence. In its annual report on China, published this month, the Pentagon warned that Beijing might fit small warheads to the Dong Feng-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile. Critics of this concept of nuclear deterrence warn that small-yield nuclear weapons on long-range missiles lower the threshold for their use, and thus make them more liable to be launched in a controlled manner on the battlefield. As part of nuclear arms control discussions it would be imperative for the US and China to understand how each approaches this topic. The notion of a usable nuclear warhead, taking it outside the realm of deterrence theology, has potential for alarming miscalculation. On nuclear weapons, China has a stated no first use policy, although the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has also adopted a “launch on warning” position under which a nuclear missile can be fired preemptively if there is a warning of an incoming missile strike. The Pentagon has confirmed that the PLA rocket force (PLARF) has conducted exercises involving early warning of a nuclear strike and launch on warning responses. This posture is broadly similar to the US and Russian position. Another important area for discussion between the US and China would be Beijing’s claim that it only maintains a minimum deterrent. Beijing’s idea of minimum or limited deterrence is clearly evolving as China, under Xi, develops its desired “world class” military.