Why it went all wrong in Afghanistan

MY ANALYSIS IN THE TIMES TODAY: The Taliban have taken the Pentagon and the White House by surprise by the speed with which they have overrun Afghanistan since American and coalition troops began withdrawing to a timetable set by President Joe Biden. From talking peace and power-sharing to American negotiators in Qatar early last year, the Taliban have reverted to type and demonstrated their dependence on brutality and unrelenting ferocity to try and snatch back the country they lost in 2001. The insurgents are at the gates of Kabul while the US, Britain and other coalition countries rush to evacuate their diplomats and civilian workers, sending thousands of troops to ensure their safety. And yet this scenario was inevitable. It is almost beyond comprehension that anyone, let alone those in power in the West, should be surprised by what is happening in Afghanistan. The Taliban promised peace solely in order to win a commitment from the US to withdraw all troops by May 2021, under President Trump’s timetable, subsequently changed to September 11 by President Biden and then revised to August 31. The date of the final withdrawal didn’t matter to the Taliban. They had the green light to launch an offensive, provided they didn’t attack US forces, and did so with their own version of America’s “shock and awe” tactics. As John Kirby, chief spokesman for the Pentagon said yesterday: “No one’s pleased to see.....that the Taliban continues to act as if they believe the only path to governance is through violence and brutality and aggression and force.” On the face of it, in sheer numbers, the Taliban were facing poor odds, with 75,000 fighters under their command up against 350,000 Afghan troops and police. But the Taliban were always going to win because once the American and coalition troops and advisers and firepower had left the country, there was no one in charge in Kabul capable of masterminding a battle plan to stop the insurgents from seizing districts and cities. Afghan special forces, easily the best-trained and most capable fighters, were deployed to defend the cities but they lacked the reinforcements and logistical back-up so desperately needed to continue the fight. Retreat became the only option. The Pentagon and White House have repeatedly stated in recent weeks that it was now up to the Afghan government to demonstrate leadership and use the advantages the US-led coalition had provided at such financial and human cost. But the sacking this week of the Afghan army chief said everything. The Kabul government has nothing left in its locker. While this may grievously disappoint all the US military commanders who tried to nurture their Afghan counterparts to take charge of an anti-Taliban force, it should never be forgotten that Afghanistan’s security forces have suffered an appalling attrition rate at the hands of the insurgents. President Ashraf Ghani, the Afghan leader, revealed in 2019 that 45,000 members of the security forces had been killed since 2014 when he took power. Since then the Kabul government has refused to issue casualty figures but in recent days the toll has been devastating. Biden was advised by all the top US military chiefs, including the two most intimately involved in Afghanistan - General Frank McKenzie, commander of Central Command, and General Scott Miller, the last leader of US forces there - to leave 3,500 US troops in the country as a safeguard and deterrent. Not to continue waging war but as a strategic presence to back up and motivate the Kabul government. Biden rejected the advice and now his political legacy will be damaged by the mayhem that decision has created.